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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a non-precedential memorandum opinion filed on 
March 27, 2000, we addressed several issues raised by 
Reginald Greene, the appellant in this case. Greene was 
charged with violating the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.S 1962(c) 
(Count One); RICO Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1962(d) (Count Two); bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1344 (Counts Three through Seventeen); money 
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1957 (Counts 
Eighteen through Thirty-One); and forfeiture. Greene 
entered into an agreement with the government, whereby 
he entered a plea of guilty to Counts One and Two. On 
appeal, Greene raised several challenges to his sentence, 
which we rejected. 
 
In a motion filed on April 5, 2000, the government 
requested that we publish our memorandum opinion to 
clarify how U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B)1 should be interpreted. 
We decline to publish the entire memorandum opinion, but 
will address in this for-publication opinion the question of 
whether Section 2F1.1(b)(7)(B)'s sentencing enhancement 
for an offense affecting a financial institution, in which the 
defendant derives more than $1 million in gross receipts 
from the offense, requires that the defendant defraud any 
single financial institution of that amount. Our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This provision was previously incorporated as U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1(b)(6)(B), but was changed to 2F1.1(b)(7)(B) effective Nov. 1, 
1998. 
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memorandum opinion of March 27, 2000, will remain on 
file, disposing of Greene's additional arguments on appeal.2 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Greene ran a large-scale criminal ring that passed stolen 
and counterfeited checks in several states. This ring 
involved more than 60 people, and operated over a period 
of at least 8 years. Greene was responsible for defrauding 
14 banks and other financial institutions out of more than 
$6 million. 
 
Greene and his lieutenants operated by gathering 
identifying information from various corporations, and then 
printing counterfeit checks on accounts belonging to those 
corporations. Greene distributed these counterfeit checks 
by sending them through his lieutenants to "squad 
leaders," who in turn employed numerous people as 
"passers." These passers opened accounts in false names at 
various banks and deposited the counterfeit checks. The 
passers then withdrew the funds from these accounts, 
wiring or sending the proceeds back to Greene. Greene also 
stole actual corporate checks, with the assistance of a bank 
employee. His enterprise cashed these checks, again using 
passers and fraudulent accounts to transfer the funds. 
 
On August 12, 1998, Greene was indicted in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. Greene entered into an agreement 
with the government, whereby he entered a plea of guilty to 
violating RICO, 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c), and to RICO 
Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d). 
 
Greene now argues that the District Court erred by 
imposing a 4 point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B). This provision applies when the offense 
affected a financial institution, and the defendant received 
more than $1 million in gross receipts from the offense. 
Greene claims that he did not defraud any single  financial 
institution of more than $1 million, even though 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. To be absolutely clear, this for-publication opinion supercedes only 
the discussion of the provision now codified at U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B) 
in our memorandum opinion filed March 27, 2000. The memorandum 
opinion disposes of the rest of the issues raised by Greene. 
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cumulatively he was responsible for losses to several 
financial institutions exceeding this amount. He therefore 
argues the District Court should not have applied this 
sentencing enhancement to him. 
 
We disagree, and will affirm the District Court. 
 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have jurisdiction over 
this appeal from a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
"When statutory construction or construction of the 
Sentencing Guidelines is required on appeal, the standard 
of review is plenary." United States v. Sabarese, 71 F.3d 94, 
95 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996). We therefore exercise plenary review 
over the District Court's determination that U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B) does not require that a defendant derive 
more than $1 million from a single affected financial 
institution. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
Greene admits that he derived more than $1 million by 
defrauding several financial institutions, but asserts that he 
did not defraud any single institution of this amount. He 
argues it was therefore error to enhance his sentence under 
Section 2F1.1(b)(7)(B). We disagree. The District Court 
correctly held that U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B) does not require 
that a defendant derive more than $1 million from a single 
financial institution. This provision states that if the 
offense: 
 
       (B) affected a financial institution and the defendant 
       derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from 
       the offense, 
 
then the offense level should be increased by four levels. 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B) (emphasis added)." `Gross receipts 
from the offense' includes all property, real or personal, 
tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or 
indirectly as a result of such offense." U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1 cmt. 
(n.16). 
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As matter of first principles, we read Guidelines 
provisions for their plain meaning. See United States v. 
Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993). Such a plain reading 
does not support Greene's argument, which inserts a 
linkage between the affected financial institution and the 
source of the total gross receipts that does not exist in the 
plain text. The requirement that a financial institution be 
affected and the requirement that the defendant derive 
more than $1 million in gross receipts from the offense are 
separate and distinct prerequisites. 
 
There is simply no case law that supports Greene's 
interpretation of this provision. "The plain language of the 
Guidelines indicates that the defendant must derive a 
million dollars from the offense, not from the financial 
institutions." United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 397 
(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 823 (1998).3 Other 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have agreed. See United States v. 
Kohli, 110 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding same); United 
States v. Kopshever, 6 F.3d 1218, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding same). Cf. United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 
192 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 61 (1999) (not 
directly addressing this issue, but noting that money 
derived from offense came from "several" institutions while 
upholding enhancement under Section 2F1.1(b)(7)(B)). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the 
enhancement to Greene's sentence resulting from the 
application of U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(7)(B). This provision does 
not require that a defendant derive more than $1 million 
from a single financial institution, so long as he or she 
derived more than $1 million in gross receipts from the 
offense. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As it is clear that Greene derived in total more than one million 
dollars 
from defrauding several financial institutions, even though not that 
much from any one financial institution, we need not and do not decide 
whether the `more than $1,000,000.00' threshold of Section 
2F1.1(b)(7)(B) can be met where all amounts derived from any financial 
institutions total less than $1,000,000.00, but the total derived from all 
sources exceeds $1,000,000.00. 
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